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CIVIL LAW PROPERTY-PRESCRIPTION-PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
APPLICABLE TO ACTIONS BASED ON ARTICLE 667
Plaintiff, as subrogated insurer of landowner, brought an
action pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 6671 against
adjoining landowner and his insurer for damages allegedly sus-
tained as a result of pile driving operations. The suit was filed
two years after the damage and defendants' plea of one year
prescription was sustained by the lower court. On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Held,
an action based on article 667 arises ex delicto and prescribes
in one year.2 Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,
170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
To ascertain the correct prescriptive period applicable to an
action it is necessary to classify it. Prior to this case the ques-
tion of what prescriptive period applied to actions arising under
article 667 had never been adjudicated. Many cases dealt with
the nature of the action provided by article 667 and from these
three different theories have developed. The servitude theory
was the earliest and suggested that the action was one imposed
by operation of law rather than one arising ex delicto and there-
fore negligence or fault was not a prerequisite to liability.8
Opposed to the servitude theory is the more recent tort theory,
4
1. LA. CrvrL CODE art. 667 (1870) : "Although a proprietor may do with his
estate whatever he pleases, still be can not make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the
cause of any damage to him."
2. Id. art. 3536: "The following actions are also prescribed by one year:
'That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages
caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses . .. ."
3. This theory originated from dictum in Loesch v. Farnsworth, 12 So.2d 222
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1943), and has been applied frequently. See Gotreaux v.
Gary, 232 La. 373, 94 So.2d 293 (1957) ; Selle v. Kleamenakis, 142 So.2d 50
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rittiner, 133 So.2d 172 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1961) ; Bankston v. Farmer's Co-op. Gin of Winnsboro, 116 So.2d
91 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1957). The theory has been criticized because it has been
applied in cases where the defendants were not adjoining property owners. See
Devoke v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 211 La. 729, 30 So.2d 816 (1947).
4. Stone, The Loesch Oase and Article 667, 17 Tur_ L. REv. 596 (1943).
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which says that the basis of liability is article 23155 and there-
fore fault must be proved before recovery will be allowed.6 The
third theory is that the cause of action under article 667 is
neither ex delicto nor ex contractu but is a form of strict liabil-
ity.7 This theory appeared after the decision in the instant case.
The French ,Code has no article which corresponds to article
667. In handling cases of damage to adjoining land where no
negligence is involved, the French impose liability by holding
that the damage alone is sufficient to create liability under
article 1384,8 one of the basic French delictual articles.9 This
approach is basically the same as that of the tort theory. It is
apparent, however, that if the tort approach is correct, then
article 667 is superfluous, for liability could be obtained through
the basic delictual articles of our Code. Such a result would
violate the principle of not rendering a statute nugatory. 0
Civil 'Code article 1760 divides civil obligations into two
groups: those created by operation of law and those created by
consent of the parties." Article 2292 divides obligations created
by operation of law into four classes. The first class comprises
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2315 (1870) : "Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it . . . ." This
is the first article in the chapter of the Code entitled Of Offenses and Quasi Of-
fease8.
6. Town of Jackson v. Mounger Motors, 98 So.2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957)
Bruno v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 67 So.2d 920 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1953) ; Hauck v. Brunet, 50 So.2d 495 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
7. Klein v. Department of Highways, 175 So.2d 454 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965)
appears to have originated the latest interpretation of article 667 that there can
be bases for an obligation other than ex delicto or ex contractu; however, there
is language in the case which makes the holding unclear. In one sentence the court
states that the action under article 667 for purposes of LA. R.S. 48:22 (1950) is
analogous to an action ex delicto. In the same paragraph the court states that the
resolution of the legislature which authorized the appellant to file suit against
the Department of Highways upon claims resulting from negligence is not permis-
sion to sue on a cause of action based on article 667. The court seems to be
indicating that an action based on article 667 is not delictual.
8. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1384 (Cachard's transl. 1930) : "A person is re-
sponsible not only for the damage which he causes owing to his own act, but also
for that which is caused by the acts of persons for whom he is answerable or by
things which are in his custody."
9. AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS no 194 (6th ed. 1935); BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET CHAUVEAU, TRAIrri THItORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL VI,
DES BIENS nos 215-217 (3d ed. 1905) ; 12 DEMOLOMBE, COUaS DE CODE NAPOLEON,
TRAITIt DES SERVITUDES II, nos 653, 658 (1882) ; as cited in Comment, 26 TuL.
L. REV. 524, 526 (1952).
10. See Gee v. Thompson, 11 La. Ann. 657, 659 (1856) : "For it is the duty
of the court, where it is possible, to give effect to every article of the code . .. ."
11. LA CIVIL CODE art. 1760 (1870) : "Civil obligations, in relation to their
origin, are of two kinds: 1. Such as are created by the operation of law. 2. Such
as arise from the consent of the parties who are bound by them, which are called
contracts or conventional obligations . . .
NOTES
obligations imposed solely by authority of law, such as engage-
ments resulting from tutorship, curatorship, and neighborhood.
The other three classes, which are quasi contracts, offenses,
and quasi offenses, arise from a fact personal to him who is
bound, or relative to him.1 2  It is apparent, therefore, that the
Civil Code provides five classes of obligations: (1) contracts,
(2) quasi contracts, (3) offenses, (4) quasi offenses, and (5)
obligations imposed solely by authority of law.13  Article 2292
corresponds to an article in the Civil Code of 1808 which speci-
fically provided that involuntary obligations between neighbor-
ing landholders resulted solely from the authority of the law.
1 4
The court in the instant case recognized the need for clas-
sifying the nature of the cause of action in order to ascertain
the correct prescriptive period, but concluded that the answer
depended upon whether the cause of action arose ex delicto or
ex contractu. This dichotomy rejects the other classes of civil
obligations provided by article 2292. It is to be noted that this
same circuit court of appeal, in a decision rendered five months
after the instant case, said that a cause of action under article
667 was neither ex delicto nor ex contractu, but was a form
of strict liability placed in the Code in the chapter on Servitudes
Imposed By, Law.' 5 Article 2292 enumerates as one of its illus-
trations of obligations imposed by authority of law "engage-
ments as result from . . . neighborhood." Article 667 again
emphasizes the idea of neighborhood when it says, "although
a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still
he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor
12. Id. art. 2292: "Certain obligations are contracted without any agreement,
either on the part of the person bound or of him in whose favor the obligation takes
place.
"Some are imposed by the sole authority of the laws, others from an act done
by the party obliged, or in his favor.
"The first are such engagements as result from tutorship, curatorship, neigh-
borhood, common property, the acquisition of an inheritance, and other cases of
a like nature.
"The obligations, which arise from a fact, personal to him who is bound, or
relative to him, result either from quasi contracts, or from offenses and quasi
offenses."
13. Planiol also states that this is the traditional classification of sources of
obligations. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no 806 (1959).
14. La. Civil Code p. 318, arts. 1, 3 (1808) : "In the number of quasi con-
tracts are not included those engagements which are formed involuntarily, such
as those tutors and other administrators who cannot refuse the function confided
to them, nor those which are formed between neighboring landholders: in all those
cases the obligation results only from the authority of the law."
15. Klein v. Department of Highways, 175 So.2d 454 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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of the liberty of enjoying his own." (Emphasis added.) In
addition, article 667 is located within title IV, Of Predial Servi-
tudes, having been taken from the works of Domat'6 in which
the article was located in section II, Of The Services of Houses
and Other Buildings of the title Services. The position of the
article in this work indicates that there was no intended relation-
ship between this article and actions arising ex delicto. On the
contrary, article 667 was based on the concept of neighborhood.
It follows therefore that it should be classified as an obligation
stemming solely from the authority of the law.
Article 3544 of the Civil Code provides a ten year pre-
scriptive period for all personal actions not specifically provided
for in the Code.17 There is no prescriptive period provided for
obligations stemming from the authority of the law, and so an
action based on such an obligation would come under article
3544 unless some other characteristic of the action would bring
it within the scope of another prescriptive article.
Article 353618 provides a one year prescriptive period for
offenses and quasi offenses. Article 353719 states that prescrip-
tion of one year applies where land, timber, or property has
been injured, cut, damaged, or destroyed. However, this article
has been construed as merely fixing the time from which the one
year delictual prescription of article 3536 begins to run and it
refers, therefore, only to cases where timber or property are
damaged through offenses or quasi offenses. 20  Article 3537
does not enumerate a prescriptive period for damage to prop-
erty caused by the breach of an obligation stemming solely from
the authority of the law. Since no other article provides a pre-
scriptive period for such an obligation, the general provision of
article 3544 should be applied.
The Louisiana courts have recognized that actions which
appear to be delictual in nature may not be.2' The jurisprudence
16. DOMAT, CIVIL LAW no 1046 (Strahan's transl. 2d ed. 1853).
17. LA. CIv I CODE art. 3544 (1870) : "In general, all personal actions, except
those before enumerated, are prescribed by ten years."
18. Id. art. 3536.
19. Id. art. 3537: "The prescription mentioned in the preceding articles runs:
"And where land, timber or property has been injured, cut, damaged or de-
stroyed from the date knowledge of such damage is received by the owner thereof."
20. See Liles v. Barnhart, 152 La. 419, 93 So. 490 (1922) ; Aegis Ins. Co. v.
Delta Fire & Cas. Co., 99 So.2d 767 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
21. In Fisher v. Levy, 180 La. 195, 156 So. 220 (1934), a deputy clerk of
court made a mistake and cancelled a mortgage which had not been paid. He was
[Vol. XXV1
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indicates that the entire petition of the plaintiff must be con-
sidered in determining the character of a particular cause of
action.22 Except for the instant case, all the actions for damages
to land or property in which the one year prescriptive period
had applied were found to be actions in tort.2 These decisions
do not in any way conflict with the position that actions which
ara based on article 667 should prescribe after a ten year period,
since in the past the courts have been quick to realize that some
actions which looked as if they arose ex delicto did not
It is clear from the wording and origin of article 667 that
it is based on the legal concept of neighborhood and, in the clas-
sification of obligations by articles 1760 and 2292 of the Code,
it is therefore an obligation stemming from the authority of
the law. It is not an offense or quasi offense. Since there is
no enumerated prescriptive period in the Code for obligations
stemming solely from the authority of the law, actions based on
article 667 should prescribe in ten years under the general pro-
visions of article 3544.
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sued and he pleaded prescription of one year. Judge O'Niell in his concurring
opinion stated that the clerk was a public official charged by article 3394 to
account for any loss resulting from his improper actions. He said that right of
action was not founded upon an offense or quasi offense in the broad sense of the
terms used in article 3536 of the Civil Code but arose ex contractu.
In Distefano v. Michiels, 158 La. 885, 104 So. 914 (1925), in an action against
a surety on a bond required to operate a public service car, Justice O'Niell held
that even though bond was given for payment of damages arising ex delicto the
action against the surety was ex contractu and prescribed in ten years.
In Foster v. City of New Orleans, 155 La. 889, 99 So. 686 (1924), the de-
fendant 'build a swimming pool twelve feet in front of the plaintiff's house.
Plaintiff sued for damages caused by the close proximity of the pool. The court
stated: "It can not be said that damages in this case arose ex delicto or from
a tort. The municipality was not at fault in any way. The suit is for compensa-
tion due under article 167 of the Constitution of 1913, for a lawful act." Id. at
891, 99 So. at 687. See also Lacour v. National Sur. Co., 147 La. 586, 85 So.
600 (1920) ; Rogay v. Julliard, 25 La. Ann. 305 (1873).
22. See Iberville Land Co. v. Amerada Pet. Corp., 141 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.
1944) ; Laclede Steel v. Silas Mason Co., 67 F. Supp. 751 (W.D. La. 1946) ; State
ex rel. Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 38 La. Ann. 912 (1886).
23. Young v. International Paper Co., 179 La. 803, 155 So. 231 (1934)
DiCarlo v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Serv., 178 La. 676, 152 So. 327 (1933)
Spyker v. International Paper Co., 173 La. 580, 138 So. 109 (1931) ; Dejean
v. Louisiana Western R.R., 167 La. 111, 118 So. 822 (1928) ; National Park
Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 159 La. 86, 105 So. 234 (1925) ; Griffin
v. Drainage Comm'n of New Orleans, 110 La. 840, 34 So. 799 (1903) ; Beauvais
v. Hall Transport Co., 49 So.2d 44 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1950) ; Roppolo v. Pick,
4 So.2d 839 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1941); Callender v. Marks, 166 So. 892 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1936); Heath v. Suburban Bldg. & Loan, 16 So. 546 (La. App.
Or]. Cir. 1935). . I o
